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T
oday’s global business environment places
increasing pressures on large companies to
create or expand their global presence. More
than 20 years ago, however, Gary Hamel and
C.K. Prahalad noted that a global brand
franchise requires significant investments that are
greater than the resources and scale found in individual
business units.1 In practice, however, decentralized
organizations often focus on business units and develop
incentive compensation schemes that reward unit per-
formance. This may interfere with positive returns at
the organizational level. Hamel and Prahalad claim that
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BY ALIGNING EVALUATION AND COMPENSATION PLANS WITH THE CONTINUED GROWTH
AND DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL ASSETS, A COMPANY CAN ENSURE ITS STRATE-
GIC BUSINESS UNIT MANAGERS CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON ITS LONG-TERM STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES RATHER THAN SACRIFICE THE FUTURE FOR SHORT-TERM GAINS.
B Y S U S A N B .  H U G H E S ,  P H . D . ,  C P A ;  C R A I G B .  C A L D W E L L ,  P H . D . ;  
A N D K A T H Y A .  P A U L S O N G J E R D E ,  P H . D .
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Strategic business unit managers are often evaluated based upon return on investment tar-
gets—targets that reward lower expenses and lower investments. This focus, however, may be at odds with the strate-
gic objectives of the larger organization that require investment in organizational assets, generally large-scale
intangible assets that form the basis for achieving the organization’s strategic goals. Investments in these intangible
assets have the potential to reduce profits in the short term but enhance profits in the long term. To encourage invest-
ment in organizational assets, organizations must align their compensation schemes with their long-term objectives.
We examine the experiences of the Steak n Shake Company to illustrate how one company aligned the objectives of
its business unit managers with its strategic plan to build human capital. 
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few companies with a strong focus on strategic business
units are able to successfully build either global distrib-
ution systems or brand positions. They suggest this
occurs because strategic business unit managers are
often evaluated based upon return on investment tar-
gets that reward lower expenses and lower invest-
ments—a focus that is at odds with the strategic
objectives of the organization as a whole. Within this
article, we discuss the importance of developing organi-
zational assets, the large-scale, generally intangible
assets that increasingly form the basis for achieving the
organization’s strategic goals. Next, we provide an
overview of a compensation scheme often used in orga-
nizations with a focus on business units. Finally, to illus-
trate the need to align business unit incentives with
organizational strategic goals, we highlight the experi-
ences of the Steak n Shake Company as it works to




A review of recent business articles indicates that many
U.S. companies identify intangible organizational assets
as key factors within their long-term strategies. Some of
the more frequently mentioned assets include innova-
tion, brands, research and development capabilities,
human capital, and supply chain efficiencies. 
Innovation. Innovation and its link to enhanced prof-
itability is well documented in the business press.2 To
develop future products and services perhaps not yet
identified by consumers, companies are developing
organizational cultures, processes, and employee teams
that are key to innovation success. For example, since
2000, Whirlpool has worked to increase innovation by
assigning a diverse group of 75 employees, ranging from
hourly workers to vice presidents, to a nine-month
innovation training experience.3 The specific annual
cost figure attached to Whirlpool’s innovation is
between $20 million and $40 million.4
Brand Value. The importance of building the value of
global brands is exemplified in the annual ranking of
the Top 100 brands as determined by Interbrand and
published annually in Business Week.5 Investing in brand
building is seen as a means to increase revenue and
operating income through higher sales volumes and/or
premium pricing. Although scholars may quibble over
the methods used to calculate brand values, they agree
there is value in brands despite the fact that this organi-
zational asset is seldom reflected on the balance sheet.
The emphasis on brand building is illustrated by Adi-
das’s and Nike’s numerous brand-related investments
made in conjunction with world soccer and the 2006
World Cup and designed to capture the global sports
market. One report notes that Adidas has invested more
than $500 million in brand-building expenses or com-
mitments since 2004, and Nike committed $144 million
to extend a single sponsorship through 2018.6
Research and Development. Research and develop-
ment (R&D) expenses allow companies to identify new
products they believe will improve future revenue and
profits. The level of R&D expenses varies by industry;
the highest percentage of R&D to revenue dollars is
usually found in the pharmaceutical industry. For exam-
ple, Eli Lilly & Co.’s 2004 annual report lists R&D
expense as $2.7 billion, or 19% of net sales.7 The tim-
ing and extent of return from R&D investments is
uncertain, which increases pressure on corporate execu-
tives to justify and continue these investments. For
example, Pfizer spent more than $21 billion on R&D
between 2000 and 2004, but its last blockbuster drug
was introduced in 1998. As an interim strategy, Pfizer
and other pharmaceutical firms seek out and acquire
new products developed by small companies.8 A similar
pattern is seen in the consumer products industry. Proc-
ter & Gamble (P&G) spends a great deal more than the
average firm on R&D, as evidenced by the $1.8 billion
(3.5% of sales) it invested in 2005.9 Even at this level of
investment, however, CEO A.G. Lafley introduced ini-
tiatives to obtain more than half of P&G’s new product
ideas from outside the company, a profound change
from the 20% that was historically derived from outside
sources.10
The R&D expenses listed above are reported at the
consolidated level. Operationally, R&D expenses are
often associated with specific initiatives undertaken
within specific business units. Business unit R&D
efforts may not prove sufficient to achieve the organiza-
tion’s strategic objectives, however, and they may also
be subject to the business unit managers’ efforts to
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manipulate R&D expenditures to meet profit goals.
Even when R&D is viewed at an organizational level,
there may be efforts to curtail current-year expense. For
example, there is evidence that companies with CEOs
close to retirement and companies that plan to issue
new equity capital both decrease R&D expenditures.11
Human capital. Investing in employees, sometimes
referred to as developing human capital, has the poten-
tial to create yet another organizational asset. Almost
two decades ago, Motorola began requiring every
employee to engage in a minimum of 40 hours of job-
related education and training per year. By 1996,
Motorola was investing $200 million annually in work-
force training and education.12 More recently, United
Airlines initiated a ramp worker training program






















Figure 1: Change in Corporate Value—Then and Now
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ing 2006, the airline plans to train 1,200 ramp workers
through a series of “Pit Crew U” training sessions in
which employees learn valuable job-related skills while
engaging in simulated NASCAR pit crew experiences.
United describes the training as “part of a multimillion
dollar investment that includes new equipment and bag
scanners.”13 United plans to expand the training to cus-
tomer service agents in 2007. Training initiatives can
also improve human capital in related businesses. For
example, DaimlerChrysler’s training academy is in the
midst of a long-term initiative to improve dealership
profitability. Adding training courses and a certification
program has increased sales by 20.3% and reduced
employee turnover by 1.3%.14
Supply Chain. Competitive advantage resulting from
supply-chain efficiencies is often linked with Wal-Mart,
but the retailer is far from alone. Whirlpool recognized
the importance of improving its supply chain and
invested tens of millions of dollars in its distribution
systems during the early 2000s, a period of significant
financial cutbacks within the corporation.15 The invest-
ment resulted in long-term cost savings, including lower
inventory levels and a proper product and placement
mix that resulted in higher sales levels. 
The organizational assets described above contribute
to a business unit’s success and, in turn, contribute to
the financial success of the organization. The enhanced
profits and cash flows allow the organization to invest in
additional organizational assets, creating a circular pat-
tern of successful investment, illustrated in Figure 1. 
Within Figure 1, the intangible assets we have dis-
cussed are referred to as organizational assets. Developing
each asset requires significant investment of organiza-
tional capital, but few of the investments generate addi-
tional earnings and net positive cash flow in the year in
which they are made. Some investments will not result
in positive returns for years. For example, consumer
product firms’ investments in innovation and R&D may
result in new products and new revenue streams within
a year or two, but pharmaceutical firms’ investments
may not result in new revenue streams for five to 10
years, if ever. 
Because generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) define organizational assets as intangible assets,
these assets are generally accounted for differently than
traditional brick-and-mortar assets. Where fixed assets
are capitalized and then depreciated over the years dur-
ing which the asset contributes to the company’s earn-
ing stream, organizational assets—unless acquired as
part of a business combination or, in rare cases, pur-
chased outright—are developed through investments
that must be expensed at the time incurred. As such,
investments in these organizational assets often reduce
short-term profitability with the hope and expectation
of increasing long-term profitability, and they fail to
appear on the balance sheet or in the notes to the finan-
cial statements. 
Figure 2 compares the ROI impact of investing in
intangible organizational assets with tangible assets. It is
obvious that investing in traditional assets increases the
base of the ROI calculation. The example also projects
that income will increase as operating expenses are
decreased or new revenue streams are possible. Either
impact is generally projected within the capital budget-
ing proposals of successful projects. Because of their clas-
sification as intangible assets, however, organizational
asset investments increase expenses without increasing
the recorded asset base. Also, because these investments
Figure 2: Investments in
Traditional and Organizational
Assets and ROI Calculations
Assume a company invests $100 financed with income and
new debt. The new equipment will result in cost savings of
$10 in Year 1. The investment in brand enhancement does
not generate additional revenue or income in Year 1. 
PRO-FORMA RESULTS
TRADITIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL
INVESTMENT: ASSET INVESTMENT: 
NEW EQUIPMENT BRAND ENHANCEMENT
YEAR 0 YEAR 1 YEAR 1
Assets $200 $300 $200
Liabilities 100 170 180
Equity 100 130 20
Net Income $20 $30 ($80)
Return on 
Investment 10% 10% (40%)
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reduce short-term profitability, business unit managers
compensated under incentive compensation schemes
linked to their unit’s financial performance will likely
avoid investing in organizational assets. Rather, the unit
managers will invest in projects that have a direct, imme-
diate, and positive impact on the results of their unit as
well as their bonus or other incentive-based compensa-
tion. Achieving short-term higher ROI may also increase
a manager’s opportunity for advancement within the
organization, providing additional pressure to invest in
unit-specific assets (and resulting income) rather than
those that benefit the entire organization. 
To avoid the conflicts between organizational strate-
gic objectives and managers’ performance measurement
schemes, executives charged with accomplishing the
strategic plan should work with appropriate accounting
personnel to determine the current organizational levels
and accounts in which organizational asset investment is
captured. Figure 3 illustrates that these expenses can
appear in at least three different income statement line
items. The executive and accounting personnel can
then work to align the strategic objectives and employ-
ee evaluation systems by developing accounting metrics
and incentive schemes consistent with the strategic
objectives of the organization. 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL-ASSET-FRIENDLY
COMPENSATION SCHEME
The conflict between the organization’s desire to invest in
organizational assets and the business unit manager’s
desire to increase ROI generally occurs because the busi-
ness unit manager is compensated through a performance-
based pay system. Performance-based pay has three
primary benefits. First, it typically attracts the best (i.e.,
most productive) employees to a company. Second, it
provides employees with a strong incentive to work
hard, because their pay literally depends on it. In addi-
tion, variable pay schemes mean that when the compa-
ny is doing well, employees benefit in the form of
higher compensation, but when the company is doing
poorly, employees bear some of the burden in terms of
lower compensation. Thus, variable pay shifts some risk
from the company to the employees. Despite these
obvious advantages, most companies do not rely exclu-
sively on variable pay schemes. Instead, they use
salaries or some combination of variable pay and
salaries. 
One problem with variable pay schemes is that it is
costly, and often difficult, to measure an employee’s
contribution. While it may be straightforward to mea-
sure a worker’s output on an assembly line, it is not as
easy for a VP of finance or marketing manager. Even if
a measurable performance indicator can be identified,
care must be taken to ensure that it is the right mea-
sure. Selecting the wrong measure can have disastrous
results for a company. For example, paying line workers
strictly on the basis of number of units produced may
result in a fast-moving assembly line, but it does not
guarantee that the units produced will be defect-free.
To solve this problem, a measure that better aligns the
efforts of the employees with the strategic goals of the
organization is needed. For example, Lincoln Electric,
long recognized as a leader in performance-based pay,
only pays workers for units produced that meet a specif-
ic quality standard, thus solving the quantity vs. quality
dilemma on its shop floor. Measurement becomes even
more problematic when many employees work together
as a team and it is difficult to determine how much of
Figure 3: Potential Impact of Segment
Income from Investments in
Organizational Assets
INCOME STATEMENT 
LINE ITEM INCREASES IN EXPENSES
Revenue
Cost of Sales u Workforce Improvement Costs 
u Research and Development 
u Changes in Supply Chain
Gross Profit
Selling, General, u Training and Development 
& Administration u Advertising and Brand Enhancement
u Segment Margin
Other Income and Expenses, u Costs Subsidized by Corporate,
including Corporate Allocated to Business Units
Overhead Charges
Business Segment Income
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the team’s success is attributable to the efforts of each
team member. 
The key to a successful performance-based pay sys-
tem is identifying appropriate performance metrics. In
the context of organizational assets, this means that par-
ticular care must be given to balancing short- and long-
term incentives. Developing organizational assets may
place short-term downward pressure on traditional earn-
ings measures. If such measures continue to be the sole
basis for performance-based pay, managers may have a
disincentive to invest in organizational assets. The solu-
tion, as illustrated by the experiences of the Steak n
Shake Corporation, is to either modify performance
metrics or alter the way in which investment costs are
handled at the organizational level.
BUILDING A BETTER “BENCH” AT STEAK N
SHAKE
In the game of basketball, coaches often seek to create
a large group of skilled players so that there is little
drop in player quality as the primary players are rotated
out of the game and other players enter. This is referred
to as having a deep bench—an analogy that resonated
with the top management team at Steak n Shake as
they worked to build their store management teams to
achieve new growth initiatives.
Steak n Shake, founded in 1934, is a unique restau-
rant chain that positions itself between quick-serve
restaurants (e.g., McDonald’s) and casual dining (e.g.,
TGI Friday’s). Its primary point of differentiation is as
an alternative to fast food, which it achieves through
the following features:
u Open 24 hours a day;
u Food cooked to order and served on china plates;
u Hand-dipped milk shakes and steak burgers made
from steak trimmings;
u Trained and friendly wait staff; and
u An average check price per person of approximately
$6.50.
Growth is driven by the number of restaurants
(referred to as “stores” within Steak n Shake), the num-
ber of return customers, the size of the customer’s
check, and the resulting margin. To maintain revenue
and profit growth, the Steak n Shake management team
focused on institutional knowledge, benchmarking oth-
ers in the industry, measuring employee turnover, feed-
back from “mystery shoppers,” and guest satisfaction
scores. Combined, these factors contribute to the suc-
cessful application of the virtuous cycle, which is viewed
as the key to success in the highly competitive restau-
rant business. Steak n Shake operationalizes the virtuous
cycles as follows: Appropriate levels of well-trained
employees should result in more satisfied customers,
larger revenue per customer order, and more repeat cus-
tomers. This, in turn, results in higher employee reten-
tion levels, which starts the cycle once again. Well-trained
employees with low turnover rates are key to Steak n
Shake’s strategic objectives and result from repeated
investments in its human capital. Combining human
capital with appropriate menu items and restaurant sites
should attract new and existing customers, increase rev-
enues, and enhance the value of the brand. 
During the late 1990s, Steak n Shake targeted an
aggressive growth strategy, but its plans were con-
strained by a lack of experienced field leaders capable
of establishing successful new restaurants. A typical
Steak n Shake restaurant has a management team of
five: two or three shift managers, a restaurant manager,
and a general manager. A general manager must have
six to 12 months of experience to head up a new restau-
rant. Hiring managers from other establishments solved
the simple numbers problem, but it also introduced
new problems. Recently hired managers were not
familiar with Steak n Shake’s unique culture and indus-
try niche. While moving an experienced manager from
an existing restaurant to a new restaurant allowed the
new restaurant to be adequately staffed, the vacancy
this move created required either the transfer of anoth-
er general manager or the promotion of a well-trained
restaurant manager. The logical solution was to train
new managers in existing restaurants and then assign
them to the new restaurants. These new managers
added to the depth of Steak n Shake’s “bench” and
provided the primary component of the virtuous cycle.
To train new managers, corporate officials asked
restaurant managers at qualified stores to hire and train
what were referred to as “an additional unit of manage-
ment.” After the training period, this new hire was
transferred to open a new store. Current managers were
ready and willing to take on this added salary cost to
7M A N A G E M E N T  A C C O U N T I N G  Q U A R T E R L Y S U M M E R  2 0 0 6 ,  V O L .  7 ,  N O .  4
further the organization’s goals and build the organiza-
tion’s “bench.” At the end of the reporting period, how-
ever, many of the managers found that their restaurant’s
profitability was below plan, and they lost their bonus
payments. Soon after this realization, experienced man-
agers refused to accept management trainees—and the
additional salary cost—at their restaurants.
This response illustrates two problems with the train-
ing plan. First, the current managers continued to be
evaluated by the same criteria used before the training
plan was adopted. Second, even if the managers antici-
pated that their restaurant costs would increase with the
salary of the trainee, it may have been difficult to offset
that salary cost unless another unit of management was
eliminated, most likely a shift manager. Other attempts
to reduce costs, such as understaffing servers or cooks,
would negatively impact guest satisfaction scores and
lead to less-satisfied employees, higher turnover, and
further declines in guest satisfaction, creating a down-
ward spiral of store performance. 
To resolve the conflict between strategic goals and
the bonus plan, Steak n Shake management developed
a compensation plan that matched its business needs.
The solution was a two-prong realignment of perfor-
mance measures and strategic organizational objectives.
The training program continued with one significant
change. Under the new system, if a store was fully
staffed and eligible, the corporate office provided it
with an extra unit of management and covered the cost
of training the manager. Thus, stores received a new
unit of management at no cost. Current managers were
once again receptive to the idea of receiving a manage-
ment trainee at their stores, because the additional
manager did not jeopardize the current managers’ abili-
ties to meet their budgets and receive bonuses. In addi-
tion, and in accordance with the virtuous cycle, the
store’s ability to meet customer satisfaction and
turnover goals was enhanced with an additional
employee in the store working toward achieving cus-
tomer satisfaction and performance goals.
Did the new training plan work? In 2005, there were
between 130 and 150 management trainees in the pro-
gram. Training stores achieved lower associate turnover
rates and enhanced guest satisfaction. From a corporate
standpoint, there were more successful store openings.
From 2003 to 2005, three metrics improved: associate
turnover dropped from 190% to 135%, management
turnover dropped from 30% to 26%, and customer
delight rose from 53% to 61%. 
Equally important, new stores experienced a steady
increase in guest satisfaction as the training program
unfolded. From an organizational view, investing in the
training program is relatively costly, adding $1.5 million
in restaurant costs in 2005, with the investment amount
expected to grow to $2.5 million in 2006. All of these
expenses are absorbed at the organizational level. Steak
n Shake’s top management clearly sees this program as
beneficial—it is a featured part of press releases, the
annual report, and conversations with the investment
community. In these conversations, Steak n Shake artic-
ulates the extent and expected impact of the invest-
ment, as measured by return on new store investment,
employee turnover, and guest satisfaction.
ALIGNING BUSINESS UNIT AND CORPORATE
OBJECTIVES
There are three lessons that can be learned from the
Steak n Shake experience. First, in order to successfully
grow a company, it may be necessary to make signifi-
cant investments in intangible organizational assets. In
the case of Steak n Shake, this organizational asset was
human capital. For other companies the key investment
lever may be global brands, R&D, or supply chains.
Investment in organizational assets requires that both
corporate and unit managers switch their focus from
short-term performance goals to long-term strategic
objectives. To facilitate this shift, it is critical to realign
performance management and incentive systems, not
only for executives but also for employees at all levels
of the company. 
Second, in the case of intangible organizational assets,
earnings growth does not often come as quickly as the
investment community may like. Therefore, the second
change involves creating a coherent and transparent sto-
ry to communicate the strategic organizational objectives
to the investment community. Although communicating
how organizational assets will be created and how they
will provide value in the long term may not resonate
well in the year of introduction, consistent positive
results over the long term will cause many critics to for-
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get their initial concerns. The use of short- and medium-
term nonfinancial measures is helpful in communicating
the company’s progress toward its strategic objectives,
and it provides a focus that is consistent with and posi-
tioned to attract long-term investors. 
Third, it is important to acknowledge that the mes-
sages communicated to business managers are often
contradictory. On one hand, managers have repeatedly
been told that they should understand the business’s
cost behavior and work toward cost reductions. On the
other hand, they are told to invest resources to build
future revenue sources, often resulting in higher short-
term expenses. Further complicating matters is the fact
that often the business unit investments that provide
superior long-term returns are those that contribute to
large-scale, intangible organizational assets that benefit
all business units. Because the cost of these invest-
ments originates at the business unit level, corporate
officials must work to gain buy-in from unit managers
through appropriate incentives and compensation
schemes. Contrary to traditional measures, these incen-
tives and schemes may include corporate subsidies,
points earned by supporting corporate-level activities,
or recognition that balancing business unit and corpo-
rate initiatives may result in reduced ROI at the busi-
ness unit level. By explicitly recognizing the impact of
corporate initiatives on business unit performance and
aligning the business unit incentives with those of the
larger corporation, business unit managers can more
easily invest in the strategic initiatives that promote the
company’s competitive advantage, whether those initia-
tives are focused on differentiation, revenue or earnings
growth, or reduced costs. n
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